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Anchoring Bias in Online Voting
Zimo Yang, Zi-Ke Zhang, and Tao Zhou∗
Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, People’s Republic of China
Voting online with explicit ratings could largely reflect people’s preferences and objects’ qualities,
but ratings are always irrational, because they may be affected by many unpredictable factors like
mood, weather, as well as other people’s votes. By analyzing two real systems, this paper reveals a
systematic bias embedding in the individual decision-making processes, namely people tend to give a
low rating after a low rating, as well as a high rating following a high rating. This so-called anchoring
bias is validated via extensive comparisons with null models, and numerically speaking, the extent
of bias decays with interval voting number in a logarithmic form. Our findings could be applied
in the design of recommender systems and considered as important complementary materials to
previous knowledge about anchoring effects on financial trades, performance judgements, auctions,
and so on.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 89.20.Ff, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb
Uncovering human behavioral patterns, such as bursty
nature of temporal activity [1, 2], scaling laws of human
travel [3, 4], different selecting patterns of different kinds
of users [5, 6] onto different kinds of objects [7, 8], is
significant to understand many socioeconomic phenom-
ena and provide high-quality services. Here we investi-
gate online voting, which contains huge business value
in e-commerce. Take recommender systems as an exam-
ple, via analyzing online votes, they can automatically
find out suitable products for every customer [9]. So it
could largely improve the performance of recommender
systems, if we make clear the knowledge about how peo-
ple vote [10, 11].
In some systems, votes are confined to only two
extremes–like or dislike, while in some other systems,
people can vote with explicit ratings–usually from one
star to five stars. Explicit ratings, however, do NOT sig-
nify rational judgments. Indeed, people’s votes may be
largely affected by prior votes [12] and social pressure
(like suggestions from friends) [13]. We do not consider
the aforementioned biases in this paper, in that when
one votes on the systems we analyze here, neither others’
votes nor social network services are provided for users,
but by comparing with null models, considerable vot-
ing bias are still observed, which originates from internal
decision-making processes of individuals, that is to say,
people strongly tend to give a low rating again after vot-
ing on a low-quality object, as well as to give a high rating
again after voting on a high-quality object. We name it
as anchoring bias, since it is similar to the well-known
anchoring effects in purchases [14, 15], auctions [16, 17],
judgements [18, 19] and estimations [20, 21] (see also the
review article [22] and the references therein). Previous
experiments [22] showed that even a randomly assigned
initial value of an object could remarkably affect our es-
timation on its real value. This paper indicates that a
prior vote on another object could affect our current vote
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because we may take that prior vote as an anchor.
TABLE I: Basic statistics of MovieLens and WikiLens. N ,
M and V denote the number of users, objects and ratings,
respectively, ρ = V
NM
denotes the sparsity of the data, and
〈r〉 is the average rating over all votes.
Data Set N M V ρ 〈r〉
MovieLens 6040 3952 1000292 0.042 3.58
WikiLens 289 4951 26937 0.019 3.71
In this paper, we consider two real data sets, Movie-
Lens and WikiLens. MovieLens is a movie rating sys-
tems with five stars (i.e., ratings can be 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5). The WikiLens is a generalized collaborative
recommender system that allows its community to de-
fine object types (e.g., beer) and categories (e.g., micro-
brews), and vote on objects. Ratings in WikiLens can
be 1, 1.5, · · · , 4.5, 5. Both the two data sets can be found
in GroupLens research web (http://grouplens.org/), and
their basic statistics are summarized in Table I.
A recommender system with explicit ratings can be de-
scribed by a weighted bipartite network where each vote
is represented by an edge connecting the corresponding
user and object, and its weight is defined as the corre-
sponding rating. The degree of a user is defined as the
number of objects she has voted, while the degree of an
object is the number of users who have voted on it. Fig-
ure 1 reports the degree distributions for users, which do
not follow neither the power-law form nor the exponen-
tial form. In fact, they lie in between exponential and
power-law forms, and can be well fitted by the so-called
stretched exponential distributions [23, 24]
p(k) ∼ kc−1 exp
[
−
(
k
K
)c]
, (1)
where K is a constant and c (0 < c < 1) is the character-
istic exponent. The borderline c = 1 corresponds to the
usual exponential distribution. For c smaller than 1, the
distribution presents a clear curvature in a log-log plot.
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FIG. 1: Distributions of user degrees, which obey the
stretched exponential form. We therefore plot the cumula-
tive distribution P (ku) instead of p(ku) and show the linear
fittings of ln(− lnP (ku)) vs. ln ku in the insets.
The exponent c can be determined by considering the
cumulative distribution
P (k) ∼ exp
[
−
(
k
K
)c]
, (2)
which can be rewritten as
ln(− lnP (k)) ∼ c ln k. (3)
Therefore, using ln k as x-axis and ln(− lnP (k)) as y-
axis, if the corresponding curve can be well fitted by a
straight line, then the slope equals c. Accordingly, as
shown in figure 1, the exponents c for MovieLens and
WikiLens are 0.92 and 0.53, respectively. Note that,
the user degree distribution of MovieLens is very close
to a usual exponential form. This kind of distributions
often displays a mixture of power-law and exponential
form [25], and are usually fitted by stretched exponential
function [23], power law with exponential cutoff [26] or
Mandelbrot law [27]. Often, the head is closer to a power
law while the tail shows exponential decay due to the lim-
itation of people’s ability in accessing information. Since
the MovieLens data only consists of users having voted on
no less than 20 movies, the head part cannot be observed
and thus the distribution is close to an exponential form.
Figure 2 reports the object degree distributions that also
obey the stretched exponential form. Note that, in some
other online user-object bipartite networks (e.g., audio-
scrobbler.com and delicious.com) where the number of
users is huge and users are not required to vote on ob-
jects, the object degree can be very well characterized by
power-law distribution [5, 28]. The distinct statistics of
object-degree distributions of the present systems have
refined our knowledge about online user-object bipartite
networks and raised open question about whether the
huge number of users and/or less efforts of actions are
necessary to the appearance of power laws.
To demonstrate the presence of anchoring bias, we first
look at an extreme case: Will we vote with systematic
bias after voting on some very high-quality or very low-
quality object–we name these objects as outliers. In the
absence of systematic bias, the next votes after outliers’
votes should be more or less the same to usual votes;
while if the anchoring bias exists, a vote on an outlier will
become the anchor of the next vote, and thus in average
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FIG. 2: Distributions of object degrees, which also obey the
stretched exponential form.
we will give high rating after voting on a high-quality
object and low rating after a low-quality object.
TABLE II: Basic statistics of outliers. The six columns from
the second to the last one are the number of low-quality out-
liers (#LQO), the number of votes right after votes on low-
quality outliers (#A−), the number of high-quality outliers
(#HQO), the number of votes right after votes on high-quality
outliers (#A+), the number of votes after votes on outliers
(#A−&A+), and the percentage of these after-outlier votes
in all votes.
Data Set #LQO #A− #HQO #A+ #A−&A+ Percentage
MovieLens 97 8526 14 10713 19239 1.92%
WikiLens 12 268 13 370 638 2.37%
We use the average rating to estimate an object’s qual-
ity, and to reduce the possible errors caused by person-
alized tastes and unreasonable votes, we only consider
the objects getting more than ten votes. Although rat-
ings cannot perfectly reflect qualities, they are correlated
with qualities and can be naturally treated as anchors
by users. For both MovieLens and WikiLens, an object
(with more than ten votes) is distinguished as low-quality
or high-quality outlier if its average rating is lower than
2.0 or higher than 4.5.
Denote by riα the rating from user i onto object
α, and for an arbitrary user i, all her ki ratings
are ordered by time as riO1 , riO2 , riO3 , · · · , riOki , where
O1, O2, O3, · · · , Oki are the objects having been voted by
i, riO1 is the oldest rating, and riOki is the most recent
rating. If Ol(l < ki) is a low-quality outlier, riOl+1 is
an after-low-quality-outlier rating (A− rating for short),
while if Ol is a high-quality outlier, riOl+1 is anA
+ rating.
According to the above criterion and definition, as shown
in Table II, there are in total 19239 (1.92% of all ratings)
after-outlier ratings for MovieLens and 638 (2.37% of all
ratings) after-outlier ratings for WikiLens. One could
observe that the high-quality outliers get more votes in
average, which is in accordance with our common sense
that better objects are more popular.
We next compare the votes after low-quality outliers
and those after high-quality outliers, namely A− and A+
votes. The average rating among all A− votes is defined
as
〈r−〉 =
1
|A−|
∑
riα∈A
−
riα. (4)
3TABLE III: Statistics of votes after outliers for MovieLens.
〈r〉, 〈do〉 and 〈du〉 respectively denote the average rating, the
average difference to object average and the average difference
to user average.
MovieLens 〈r〉 〈do〉 〈du〉
A−votes 2.72 -0.054 -0.635
A+votes 4.16 0.033 0.449
TABLE IV: Statistics of votes after outliers for WikiLens.
〈r〉, 〈do〉 and 〈du〉 respectively denote the average rating, the
average difference to object average and the average difference
to user average.
WikiLens 〈r〉 〈do〉 〈du〉
A−votes 2.63 -0.071 -0.850
A+votes 4.13 0.061 0.372
In addition, we look at the difference between a rating
riα ∈ A
− and the average rating on the object α, as well
as the difference between riα and the average rating by
the user i. Accordingly, we define the average difference
to object average as
〈d−o 〉 =
1
|A−|
∑
riα∈A
−
(riα − 〈r•α〉), (5)
where 〈r•α〉 denotes the average rating on α, and the
average difference to user average as
〈d−u 〉 =
1
|A−|
∑
riα∈A
−
(riα − 〈ri•〉), (6)
where 〈ri•〉 denotes the average rating by i. Analogously,
we can define 〈r+〉, 〈d+o 〉 and 〈d
+
u 〉 for A
+ votes.
Table III and Table IV show the remarkable difference
between people’s votes after low-quality and high-quality
outliers, respectively. The results indicate the possible
presence of anchoring bias, that is, people tend to give a
low rating if the prior-visited object is not good, and vice
versa. However, the above evidence is not solid enough
since it covers only a tiny fraction of votes, and thus we
will further analyze the full rating series of every user.
To get rid of the effects of different voting standards
of users (e.g., some users are good-tempered and tend to
give high ratings than others) and different deserving rat-
ings of objects (e.g., some objects are of better qualities
and should be voted with high ratings), we regulate each
rating riα in the following four ways: (i) to eliminate the
average rating over all votes as r′
iα
= riα − 〈r〉; (ii) to
eliminate the average rating over all votes on the corre-
sponding object as r′
iα
= riα−〈r•α〉; (iii) to eliminate the
average rating over all votes on the corresponding user as
r′
iα
= riα − 〈ri•〉; (iv) to eliminate both average ratings
as r′iα = (riα−〈r•α〉)+ (riα−〈ri•〉). Readers are easy to
reproduce all the following experiments and will find that
the four cases lead to qualitatively the same results, and
thus we only present the results of case (iv) hereinafter
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Rating series of a typical user in Movie-
Lens who has voted 106 movies in total. All these 106 ratings
are displayed according to the voting time in panel (a), and
the positive and negative ratings are respectively represented
by light-green and dark-green lines in panel (b).
and without specific statement, the term rating(s) stands
for regulated rating(s) of case (iv).
Figure 3(a) presents the rating series of a typical user
in MovieLens. We simply divide ratings into two classes–
positive ratings and negative ratings, and display them
without explicit values in figure 3(b), where one could
observe that ratings in the same class are aggregated.
This kind of aggregation reveals the anchoring bias in
voting behavior, namely people is likely to give a high
rating after a prior high rating while is likely to give a
low rating after a prior low rating. Similar to the method
used to measure the memory effect of a time series [29],
to quantify the aggregation phenomenon for an arbitrary
user i, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient
Ri(−1 ≤ Ri ≤ 1) of two series riO1 , riO2 , · · · ,riOki−1 and
riO2 , riO3 , · · · ,riOki , where the Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient for two finite series x1, x2, · · · , xn and y1, y2, · · · , yn
is defined as
R(x, y) =
∑n
i=1
(xi − 〈x〉)(yi − 〈y〉)√∑n
i=1
(xi − 〈x〉)2
√∑n
i=1
(yi − 〈y〉)2
. (7)
According to the definition, a positive Ri indicates that
the user i may have the anchoring bias.
We compare the empirical results with those of a null
model, in which each user’s voting times are randomly
redistributed. That is to say, for an arbitrary user i, the
rating series {riO1 , riO2 , · · · ,riOki }, is reordered. Fig-
ure 4 compares the distributions of Pearson correlation
coefficients R of the empirical data and the null model.
Clearly, the distributions of the null model peak at about
zero, while the empirical distributions peak at a posi-
tive value. In addition, the empirical distributions, as
a whole, lie in the right of the distributions of the null
model. From the cumulative distributions, one could see
that for the null model, less than 50% of users are of
positive R, while for the empirical data, more than 70%
of users are of positive R. Aforementioned comparison
shows the significance of the anchoring bias in empirical
data.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Distributions of users’ Pearson corre-
lation coefficients R. (a) and (c) are for MovieLens, while (b)
and (d) are for WikiLens. (a) and (b) show the histograms
where p(R) is the probability density of R, while (c) and (d)
show the cumulative distributions where P (R) denotes the
fraction of users whose Pearson correlation coefficients are
less than R. In each panel, results from the real data and the
null model are respectively colored in red and blue.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The average Pearson correlation co-
efficient R(L) versus the correlation length L for MovieLens
(a) and WikiLens (b). The blue and black curves respectively
represent the results of the real data and the null model. Pan-
els (c) and (d) display how the difference between R(L) of the
real data and the null model changes with L in the linear-log
scale.
If the number of votes of a user i is larger than L,
we could extend the Pearson correlation coefficient Ri
to an L-dependent coefficient Ri(L) as the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient of two series riO1 , riO2 , · · · ,riOki−L
and riOL+1 , riOL+2 , · · · ,riOki . As shown in figure 5, the
average value of the L-dependent Pearson correlation co-
efficient, 〈R(L)〉, of the empirical data over all users is
remarkably larger than that of the null model for small
L, and the difference between 〈R(L)〉 of the empirical
data and the null model decays in a logarithmic way as
∆〈R(L)〉 ≈ A−B logL, (8)
where A ≈ 0.08 and B ≈ 0.04 for both MovieLens and
WikiLens. This result again indicates the existence of
the anchoring bias. Moreover, it suggests that this bias
will last a considerable time period, which is in accor-
dance with previous experimental results on the duration
of anchoring effects [30].
Combining those aforementioned experiments, the ex-
istence and significance of the anchoring bias in online
voting is obviously validated, whose pattern, as shown in
figure 3, is very similar to the memory-embedded time
series [29]. The extent of the anchoring bias, quantified
by the difference of the average regulated rating from the
null model, decays in a logarithmic form and will last a
considerable duration. Most known literature on anchor-
ing effects considered people’s judgements, evaluations,
estimations and predictions in offline world, meanwhile
the quick development of Internet and the data process-
ing technologies allow us to study the rich social psycho-
logical phenomena in online world. Quantitative analy-
sis and statistical description based on BIG DATA may
build up a new paradigm for social psychology and facil-
itate the birth of a new branch of psychology, probably
called Internet psychology. This work is an elementary
attempt that tries to uncover underlying decision-making
processes based on extensive statistical analysis. Our
findings are helpful in understanding the online voting
pattern and improving the performance of recommender
systems.
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